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ABSTRACT 
With the emergence of XML as the de facto standard to exchange 
and disseminate information, the problem of regulating access to 
XML documents has attracted a considerable attention in recent 
years. Existing models attach authorizations to nodes of an XML 
document but disregard relationships between them. However, 
ancestor and sibling relationships may reveal information as 
sensitive as the one carried out by the nodes themselves (e.g., 
classification). This paper advocates the integration of 
relationships as first class citizen in the access control models for 
XML and makes the following contributions. First, it 
characterizes important relationship authorizations and identifies 
the mechanisms required to translate them accurately in an 
authorized view of a source document. Second, it introduces a 
rule-based formulation for expressing these classes of relationship 
authorizations and defines an associated conflict resolution 
strategy. Rather than being yet-another XML access control 
model, the proposed approach allows a seamless integration of 
relationship authorizations in existing XML access control model. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Security and Protection] Access controls; H.2.7 
[Database Administration] Security, integrity, and protection 
General Terms 
Security, Legal Aspects  
Keywords  
Data confidentiality, XML access control, XML relationship, 
need-to-know and consent principles. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
XML has become the de facto standard to describe, exchange and 
disseminate any kind of information among various partners and 
for various purposes. Meanwhile, safeguarding data 
confidentiality, privacy and intellectual property has become a 
primary concern for citizens, administrations and companies. This 
motivated several recent works on XML access control, tackling 
different facets of the problem. Discretionary [2,8,12,16], Role-
Based [15, 25] and Mandatory [7] access control models have 
been proposed in the context of XML. A particular attention has 
been paid on the granularity of the access control (from DTD to 
attribute instances) [2,8,12], on the performance of the algorithms 
implementing this control [7,19,26], on the distribution channel 
used to expose the information (pull, push, selective 
dissemination) [3,5,20] and on the tamper-resistance of the access 
control [6,18,23]. 
All these works have the commonality to focus the access control 
on the nodes of an XML document (elements and attributes). 
Ancestor and sibling relationships among nodes are not 
considered as legitimate targets of the access control. Roughly 
speaking, an access control policy is composed of a set of positive 
(resp. negative) authorization rules granting (resp. denying) a 
given subject access to some nodes of the document. These nodes 
are usually selected thanks to XPath expressions. The descendant 
relationship among nodes is simply exploited as a mean to 
propagate authorization rules down through the XML hierarchy. 
There are substantial differences among the models in the way 
conflicts among – potentially propagated – positive and negative 
rules are tackled. In [2,12], the complete subtree rooted at a 
forbidden node is forbidden. This constraint is relaxed in [8], 
allowing exceptions to a negative rule to be expressed. However, 
this leads to make visible the label (i.e., tag) of forbidden 
ancestor(s) in the path from the root to an authorized node. 
Replacing the node label by a dummy value has been proposed in 
[10,13] to reduce information disclosure in such situation. These 
discrepancies among the models brings to light the difficulty to 
define accurately the view that should be delivered of the path 
leading to an authorized node. 
More precisely, disregarding XML relationships in the expression 
of the access control leads to two important problems. 
- Classification disclosure: the structure of an XML document 
often reveals a classification (e.g., subtrees organized 
according to the medical services where patients are treated, 
activities or sales areas of companies, socio-economic 
categories of citizens or profiles of customers). Therefore, the 
membership of an authorized node to a given subtree conveys 
its classification. Whatever be the information hidden in the 
root node of that class to protect this sensitive information, it 
can be often inferred by simple statistical attacks (the 
cardinality of a class frequently reveals this class). In addition, 
disclosing the class membership for a single element discloses 
the membership for all, making any obfuscation mechanism 
preserving the class decomposition non-robust. 
- Uniform filiation: the authorization rules expressed on 
ancestor nodes determines a common authorized view of the 
path leading to all their descendants. In other words, there is 
no way to deliver two different authorized views of the same 
ancestor for two of its descendants (e.g. one patient is willing 
to hide the medical service she is treated in, while another 
consents to disclose this information). 
These two problems hurt the basic need-to-know and consent 
principles enacted in most directives and laws related to the 
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safeguard of personal information, like the Federal Privacy Act in 
the US [22] and the Data Protection Directive in the EU [9]. The 
need-to-know principle limits access to information to those 
people who need strictly this information to carry out their duties. 
Clearly, classification disclosure hurts this principle each time the 
information contained in a given subtree (e.g., a personal folder) 
is self-content wrt a given purpose. The consent principle 
prohibits the disclosure of personal information without the 
explicit consent of the donor in a number of situations defined by 
the law. In our context, this means that the donor must be given 
some prerogative to control how her information (e.g., her 
medical folder) is exposed and made accessible in an XML 
document. This requirement contradicts a uniform filiation.  
More than ever, there is a strong need to define access control 
models that help translating more accurately law principles into 
practice. To make a step forward in this direction, this paper 
advocates the integration of ancestor and sibling relationships as 
first class citizen in the access control models for XML. As 
mentioned above, relationships between nodes may reveal 
information as sensitive as the one carried out by the nodes 
themselves and hence, deserve to be protected as such. The 
objective is to provide means to control accurately the view that 
must be delivered of the path leading to any authorized node (i.e., 
subtree) in an XML document. More precisely, this paper makes 
the following contributions : 
1. Characterization of relationship authorizations 
The first problem is to characterize which relationships need to be 
protected and to define the means by which they can be protected. 
We identify the relationship authorizations required to deal with 
the classification disclosure and uniform filiation problems. Then, 
we exhibit the mechanisms necessary to translate them accurately 
into the authorized view of a source document.  
2.  Relationship-aware access control model 
The second problem is to define a simple but comprehensive 
access control model encompassing nodes and relationships 
authorizations. We propose a rule-based formulation for 
expressing relationship authorizations and we define a conflict 
resolution strategy to manage the conflicts that may occur among 
them. Rather than being yet-another XML access control model, 
our approach allows a seamless integration of relationship 
authorizations in existing XML access control models. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a case 
study motivating the integration of XML relationships in the 
expression of access control policies. Section 3 characterizes the 
relationship authorizations required to deal with the classification 
disclosure and uniform filiation problems. Section 4 introduces a 
rule-based formulation for expressing relationship authorizations 
and discusses the upward compatibility of our approach with 
existing XML access control models. Section 5 presents related 
works. Finally, section 6 concludes and sketches important open 
issues. 
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE 
We built our motivating example from requirements expressed by 
a real life medical application related to the treatment of AIDS 
disease. Figure 1 depicts the way the medical information of 
interest is structured. Organizing a safe sharing of medical folders 
among several parties (patients, physicians, pharmacists, medical 
labs, Medicare and insurance companies) having different duties 
and objectives is a rather challenging task.  
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Figure 1. Medical Folders 
Below are three examples of simple but important authorization 
rules that cannot be managed accurately with existing XML 
access control models. 
− R1: Hide to the hospital’s directory application the name of 
the service where patients are treated, for those who didn’t 
consent making this information public. 
As stated in HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act) [24], the hospital directory is a rather 
sensitive information considering the inquiries made about 
patients by relatives, employers, media, police and members of 
religious groups. The effect of this authorization rule on the 
document pictured in Figure 1 should be to attach the Folder 
element of each patient of interest to a depersonalized medical 
service element (i.e., element with an anonymous label) while 
keeping the ancestor chain of the other folders unaffected.  
XML access control models like [2,12] give the ability to hide a 
folder in the document. This does not match the objective since 
the presence of the patient in the hospital turns to be hidden as 
well, which is not the purpose of Rule R1. The model proposed in 
[8] allows defining a negative rule on a medical service and a 
positive one on folder. Unfortunately, the label of the medical 
service (the information to be protected in our context) will be 
disclosed. This problem is tackled in [10,13], by replacing this 
label by a dummy value. However, whatever be the model, 
classification disclosure is not precluded and above all, the 
authorization rule applies uniformly to all folders, neglecting the 
patient’s consent.  
− R2: Hide to pharmacists the fact that some drug 
prescriptions participate in a protocol (i.e., medical trial). 
The pharmacist must be aware of all prescriptions to check drug 
incompatibilities. However, giving him the knowledge that some 
drugs participate in a protocol discloses unnecessary information 
on the patient’s disease and its stage. The expected effect of this 
authorization rule is to drop Protocol elements and attach Act 
elements as direct children of their MedActs ancestor, giving 
them a position similar to regular Act elements. Depersonalizing 
Protocol is useless in this case since that information would be 
obvious to infer (Act elements children of MedActs and those 
children of Protocol form two classes with their ancestor as a 
distinguishing factor). 
Again, existing access control models give the ability either to 
hide the complete subtree rooted at a Protocol element or to 
depersonalize Protocol elements. Both solutions hurt the need-
to-know principle by disclosing too little or too much information. 
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Figure 2. Authorized views. 
− R3: Hide to medical labs the correlation between medical and 
administrative information inside each folder. 
HIPAA stipulates that the patient consent is required for any 
disclosure related to marketing. In the following we assume that 
the medical information (MedActs, Analysis) is required 
wrt the need-to-know principle while the administrative 
information (Name, Address) is collected under the patient 
consent for marketing purpose (e.g., related to new medications). 
The expected effect of this authorization rule is to make both 
groups of information available while precluding the inference of 
their initial sibling relationship. 
Using existing access control models would impose to define two 
separate access control policies for the same document and the 
same user (i.e., the medical lab). However, the conjunction of 
both authorized views must be precluded and the risk of inference 
mentioned above must be carefully tackled, a rather challenging 
issue [14]. These three situations demonstrate the limits of 
existing access control models and advocate the integration of 
explicit authorizations on ancestor and sibling relationships in the 
expression of access control policies. On the other hand, 
authorizations on nodes are well suited to define the fraction of 
each folder that must be disclosed in each situation. The three 
expected authorized views of the initial document, derived by a 
combination of nodes and relationship authorizations, are pictured 
in Figure 2. 
Finally, one may wonder about the number of authorization rules 
that should be defined to capture the personal consent of each 
person. While consent is a personal matter, it is worth-noting that 
its dimensions (as enacted by the law) are quite reduced. 
Therefore, consent can be integrated in each folder by dedicated 
XML elements, allowing capturing the common consent of 
several people in a single set-oriented authorization rule. This 
point will be illustrated in Section 4. 
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF 
RELATIONSHIP AUTHORIZATION 
Existing XML access control models interpret an access control 
policy as a mapping between a source document (or Source for 
short) and an authorized view of this same document (or View) 
and rely on the assumption that View ⊆ Source. More 
precisely, authorization rules select the subset of Source nodes 
that will participate in View. As a side effect, edges having one 
of their extremity node discarded by an authorization rule are in 
turn discarded from View. As our motivating example makes 
clear, considering relationship authorizations compels us to revisit 
this assumption since View may result from a more complex 
restructuration of Source. Typically, new paths and nodes may 
appear in View and the node ordering may be different from the 
Source one to prevent inference. In other words, View 
represents the total amount of information a grantee can gather by 
subsequent queries. In this section, we concentrate on the 
semantics of relationship authorizations and define for each of 
them its impact on the resulting View. 
3.1 Notations  
Let us now introduce the model of XML document we consider 
and the associated notations that will be used along the paper. An 
XML document d is defined by a tuple (Labeld, Valued, Nd, rd, Ed, 
φlabel, λvalue, ϕorder), where: 
− Labeld : is a set of element labels (also called tags) and 
attribute names of type string. 
− Valued : is a set of attribute/element values of type string. 
− Nd = Ned∪Nad is a set of nodes representing elements and 
attributes, respectively. Each n∈Ned has a required element 
label∈Labeld and an optional element value∈Valued, whereas 
each n∈Nad has a required attribute label∈Labeld and a 
required attribute value∈Valued.  
− rd : is a particular node representing the document root. 
− Ed : Ed ⊂ (Nd∪rd) × Nd is a set of edges, where each e∈Ed 
represents an element-subelement or element-attribute 
relationship. 
− φlabel  : Nd → Labeld  is the node labeling function. 
− λvalue : Nd → Valued is the node valuation function. 
− ϕorder : Nd → Integer is the node ordering function, reflecting a 
preorder traversal of the tree. 
In addition, Anc(n), Child(n), Desc(n) and Sibling(n) denote 
respectively the set of ancestors, childs, descendants and siblings 
of a given node n∈Nd and Parent(n) denotes its parent node. 
Path(n1,n2) denotes a path from node n1 to node n2. According 
to this model, an XML document is modeled as a labeled graph 
where nodes represent elements and attributes, and edges 
relationships between them. If a node does not have any parent, it 
is implicitly linked with the document root. 
3.2 Cloning and Shuffling mechanisms  
Taking into account user’s consent in access control models 
imposes to generate in View different replicas of the same 
Source nodes and paths. Basically, replicating a Source node 
n1 is required each time two of its authorized descendants n2 and 
n3 must be reachable in View by a path delivering two 
conflicting visions of n1 to conform to the semantics of a given 
authorization rule. Rule R1 of our motivating example illustrates 
this point. Since an XML document is a tree, every node 
participating in the common subpath Path (n1,Parent(n2))∩ 
Path(n1,Parent (n3)) has in turn to be replicated. Cloning is the 
principle by which Source elements and paths are replicated in 
View. Note that leaf nodes of a source document (terminal 
elements and attributes) are never subject to cloning. In the 
following, we use the term original and clone(s) to distinguish in 
View between the genuine image of a Source element or path, 
and the element(s) or path(s) resulting from a cloning operation. 
Element Cloning 
We denote by ñi∈NeView the ith clone of node n∈NeSource. 
Subscripts are used when the different clones of a same node have 
to be distinguished and are omitted otherwise. The label, value 
and order of a clone are defined as follows:  
φlabel(ñ) ∈ {φlabel(n) ,“anonymous”}
1, 
λvalue(ñ) = ∆, where ∆ denotes the empty string, 
ϕorder(ñ) = Shuffle(Sibling(ñ)). 
Where Shuffle defines a random order among the clones being 
sibling of a same node. The necessity of shuffling is explained 
afterward. 
Path Cloning  
Let u be a path (n1,n2…nk) / n1,n2…nk ∈ NeSource and 
(n1,n2)…(nk-1,nk) ∈ ESource, ũ denotes the clone of u and is 
defined by (ñ1,ñ2…ñk) / ñ1,ñ2…ñk ∈ NeView and (ñ1,ñ2)…(ñk-
1,ñk) ∈ EView.  
The ordering of clones in View has to be carefully managed to 
avoid basic inference. To illustrate this, let us consider Rule R3 of 
our motivating example and assume that the View ordering is 
such that all instances of the two groups (MedActs, Analysis) 
and (Name, Address) keep the same relative order as in 
Source. In this case, their initial sibling relationship, which 
should be obfuscated by the cloning mechanism, is patently 
disclosed by the element ordering (i.e., the ith instance of 
MedActs, Analysis) corresponds to the ith instance of (Name, 
Address)). A similar problem exists with Rule R1 if the clones 
of a medical service element are placed in close proximity to their 
original (e.g., direct right or left sibling). Thus, cloning does not 
make sense without node shuffling (see Figure 2.a and 2.c).  
Node shuffling 
Node shuffling is a recursive process that applies at each node of 
View containing clone children. All clones, children of a given 
node, are shuffled together to prevent ordering-based inference. 
For a given node, the clone children are grouped after the original 
ones (by convention), and then shuffled. The relative order of the 
original children must however be preserved in View since node 
ordering is significant in XML. The ordering function ϕorder must 
therefore satisfy the two following properties:  
− ∀ni,nj∈NSource, ∀ni’,nj’∈NView / ni=ni’ and nj=nj’, ϕorder(ni) 
< ϕorder(nj) ⇒ ϕorder(ni’) < ϕorder(nj’) 
                                                          
1 By default, a clone inherits the label of its source counterpart, 
except if the anonymous value is explicitely selected. 
− ∀ñ∈NView, ϕorder(ñ)=random(]max(ϕorder(Parent(ñ)), 
ϕorder(iops(ñ))), ϕorder(ifol(Parent(ñ)))[), 
where iops and ifol denote respectively the immediate original 
preceding sibling and immediate following of a given node, where 
preceding sibling and following conform to the XPath semantics. 
3.3 Authorizations on ancestor relationships 
Relationship authorizations are introduced to tackle the two 
problems identified in the introduction and exemplified in the 
motivating example, namely classification disclosure and uniform 
filiation.  
Let us first consider classification disclosure. The objective is to 
mask the membership of a given descendant node n to a given 
class rooted at an ancestor node a. In this respect, two situations 
have to be carefully distinguished. The information to be 
protected can be either: (1) to which class the node n belongs to, 
or (2) the fact that n is actually classified.  
In the former case, the information to be hidden is the 
identification of the class n belongs to. This information is carried 
out by the ancestor node a, either by its label, by one of its 
attribute or by one of its sub-element. Cloning the ancestor node a 
and the path leading to n is a mean to hide this information. 
Indeed, attributes and sub-elements do not participate in the 
cloning operation and a’s label can be made anonymous if it 
actually conveys the class identification. This leads to a first class 
of authorization called ancestor depersonalization. 
In the latter case, the information to be hidden is the presence of a 
itself, in the path leading to n. This situation occurs each time a 
class membership reveals an exception to a general situation (e.g., 
Rule R2 of our motivating example). Cloning the path from the 
ancestor node a to n allows discarding a from that path. This leads 
to a second class of authorization called path reduction.  
Regarding now the uniform filiation problem, the objective is to 
allow descendant nodes expressing potentially different 
requirements in terms of classification disclosure. Hence, both 
problems have to be considered jointly. Cloning provides a 
uniform solution to them. Indeed, cloning the path linking an 
ancestor to one of its descendant gives the opportunity to 
personalize the authorized view of each ancestor relationship.  
The semantics of ancestor depersonalization and of path reduction 
authorizations is defined as follows in terms of their expected 
effects on View. Let n ∈ NSource. Let a, u ∈ NeSource / a ∈ Anc(n) 
and u = Parent(n). 
Ancestor depersonalization 
- If a=u then Element_Cloning(a) else Path_Cloning(a,u);  
- Parent(ã)←Parent(a); 
- Parent(n) ← ũ;  // if a=u then ã = ũ 
Path reduction  
- If a=u then Parent(n) ← Parent(a) else { 
     Let e ∈NeSource  / e = Child(a) ∩  Anc(n) 
    - if e=u then Element_Cloning(e) else Path_Cloning(e,u); 
    - Parent(ẽ)←Parent(a); 
    - Parent(n) ← ũ;   // if e=u then ẽ = ũ }  
Notice that n is always attached along with its potential subtree to 
the extremity of the cloned path. At this point, it is interesting to 
note that node authorizations in existing models follow a top-
down approach in the sense that node authorizations usually 
propagate down through the XML hierarchy. Conversely, 
ancestor depersonalization and path reduction authorizations 
follow a bottom-up approach by impacting the relationship 
between descendant nodes and their respective ancestors. 
3.4  Effect on sibling relationships 
While masking the membership of a given node to a given class, 
care should be taken about the correlation between that node and 
its initial siblings. The semantics introduced in the preceding 
section for relationship authorizations implicitly break down 
sibling relationships. This side effect may hurt the need-to-know 
principle in a number of situations. Conversely, implicitly 
preserving all sibling relationships while disconnecting a node 
from a class resurrects the uniform filiation problem and hence 
may hurt the consent principle. Therefore, there is a need for a 
more selective sibling decorrelation to cope with situations where 
a node has to retain its relationships with a group of siblings while 
being disconnected from its initial class. 
Sibling Selection on Ancestor Relationships 
Let n ∈ NSource and n' its image in NView. Let g1, g2 ⊂ NSource / 
∀e1, e2 ∈ g1∪g2, Parent(e1)=Parent(e2)= Parent(n). Keeping the 
sibling relationship between g1’s elements and n has the 
following impact on the document View:  
- ∀e1 ∈ g1, Parent(e1') ← Parent (n') : attach g1’s elements 
and n to the same parent in View, while g2’s elements 
remain attached to the original parent in View. 
As a conclusion, dealing with classification disclosure and 
uniform filiation introduces a two-dimensional problem that must 
be tackled on a node basis: (1) how the relationships between a 
given node and its ancestors must be mapped in View; (2) which 
sibling relationships have to be preserved for that node in View. 
How relationship authorizations are actually declared, how they 
interact with node authorizations and how conflicts among rules 
are managed is the topic of the next section. 
4. RELATIONSHIP-AWARE ACCESS 
CONTROL MODEL 
4.1 Preliminaries 
An authorized view can be seen as the result of a global selection 
and restructuration process applied to the source document. At 
first glance, a general-purpose language like XQuery could be 
considered as the appropriate mean to define this process. 
However, even simple XML document restructurations can result 
in rather complex XQuery expressions [11]. For this reason, we 
follow in existing XML access control models’ footstep by 
expressing an access control policy as a set of authorization rules, 
a rule engine being responsible for managing conflicts among 
rules and for translating Source into View according to 
these rules. Our approach allows a seamless integration of 
relationship authorizations in existing models. In this section, we 
first introduce a reference model for expressing node 
authorizations that captures the common foundation of existing 
XML access control models. Then, we propose an extension to 
this reference model that supports relationship authorizations. 
4.2 Reference model for node authorizations  
While existing XML access control models introduce subtleties 
on the way node authorizations propagate down through the 
hierarchy and conflicts are solved, they share strong 
commonalities. Basically, an authorization rule takes the form of 
a tuple <Subject, Object, Operation, Sign>. Depending on the 
models, Subject can take many forms (a user, a group of users, a 
role, an application, an IP address, etc). Object characterizes the 
part of the XML document targeted by the rule. Due to its 
simplicity and expressiveness, XPath is usually the language 
elected to identify the target nodes of each rule. Operation 
denotes the operation (read, update, etc) the Subject may perform 
on the Object. Finally, Sign denotes either a permission (grant 
rule) or a prohibition (deny rule) for that operation. In the sequel, 
we do not make any assumption on the way subjects are managed 
and, since the focus is on data confidentiality, read is the only 
operation of interest. A node authorization rule NA is defined by a 
tuple: <Subject, Objects, Sign> where: Subject is an abstract 
entity, Objects ⊆ NSource, Sign ∈ {+, -}. 
 
To match the well accepted least privilege principle, we consider 
a closed policy, meaning that an implicit negative authorization 
applies to the whole document. In other words, the access to every 
object that is not explicitly authorized is forbidden. We assume 
that both positive and negative authorizations propagate implicitly 
down through the XML hierarchy. This mode of propagation 
corresponds to the cascading option present in well-known 
models [3,8,12,19]. Conflicts between direct and/or propagated 
rules are managed as follows. Let us assume two rules R1 and R2 
of opposite sign. These rules may conflict because they are 
defined either on the same node, or on two different nodes n1 and 
n2, linked by an ancestor relationship (i.e., n1∈Anc(n2)). In the 
former situation, the Denial-Takes-Precedence policy favors the 
negative rule according to the least privilege principle. In the 
latter situation, the Most-Specific-Object-Takes-Precedence 
policy favors the rule that applies directly to a node against the 
inherited one (i.e., R2 takes precedence over R1 on n2). In other 
words, authorizations propagate until overridden by an opposite 
authorization on a descendant node. 
4.3 Relationship authorization rules  
A relationship authorization rule RA is defined by a tuple 
<Subject, Objects>, where Objects is in turn defined by a 4-
tuples: <Anc, Desc, Path-visibility, Sibling> 
− Anc and Desc characterize the relationship(s) to be protected 
among a (set of) descendant(s) and one of its (their) ancestor. 
Anc and Desc are the common denominator of all relationship 
authorizations. They are both defined as XP{[],*,//} path 
expressions. 
− Path-visibility characterizes the vision of the path u linking each 
descendant node to its ancestor. For each node n participating in 
u, Path-visibility states whether the node is preserved or not in 
the path clone ũ and, in the positive case, whether n’s label is 
preserved or not in ñ. 
− Implicitly, hiding an ancestor relationship hides the relationship 
between a descendant node and its siblings. To allow for a 
selective sibling decorrelation, Sibling characterizes the list of 
siblings a descendant must keep its relationships with. 
The RA definition deserves two important remarks. First, RA 
captures gracefully and in a rather simple way the different forms 
of relationship authorizations. By defining Anc and Desc as 
XPath expressions, it allows to sum up Desc ancestor 
relationships in a single statement. Second, unlike NA, RA does 
not integrate a Sign parameter. The reason for this is that RA 
characterizes only negative authorizations. The global semantics 
of the model is as follows. NA rules are defined according to a 
closed policy and deliver an authorized view View’ ⊆ Source 
in the usual way (i.e., edges having one of their extremity node 
discarded by a NA rule are in turn discarded from View’). RA 
rules are defined on View’ according to an open policy and 
deliver the final authorized view View. Consequently, if no RA 
rule is defined, the semantics of the model complies with the one 
of the existing XML access control models. Hence, a seamless 
integration of relationship authorizations in these models can be 
reached. 
Ancestors and Descendants 
For a RA rule to be consistent, condition Desc⊆Anc must be 
enforced, where ⊆ denotes the containment relation between 
XPath expressions. Unfortunately, the containment problem has 
been shown co-NP complete for the class of  XP{[],//,*} expressions 
[17]. To avoid consistency checking, Desc is defined as a relative 
expression with respect to Anc. Thus, Anc determines a set of 
path origins while Anc/Desc determines a set of path extremities. 
Path visibility and Sibling 
Table 1 (resp. Table 2) summarizes the possible choices for the 
Path-visibility (resp. Sibling) parameter along with their 
associated semantics. The first row of each table gives an 
extensive syntax for the corresponding parameter while the next 
rows propose shortcuts to express a monotonic policy along the 
path.  
Table  1. Path-visibility semantics 
Path-visibility Semantics of Path visibility 
[label1?,.,labeln?] gives the list of nodes to be discarded (?=†) 
or depersonalized (?=Φ). 
[] all nodes are kept on the path (i.e., all nodes 
are cloned) and their original label is 
inherited. This option is the default one. 
 [Φ] all nodes are kept on the path and are 
depersonalized (i.e., the label of their 
respective clone is set to ”anonymous”). 
[†] All nodes are discarded from the path. 
Table  2. Sibling semantics 
Sibling Semantics of Sibling 
[label1,…labeln] Nodes those label belongs to this list must keep 
their sibling relationship with the descendant 
node of interest. 
[⊥] The descendant node is disconnected  from all 
its siblings. This is the default option. 
[ψ] The descendant node preserves its sibling 
relationships with all siblings targeted by the 
same authorization rule as him. 
[≡] The descendant node preserves all the sibling 
relationships it is involved in. 
Figure 3 illustrates the use of a relationship-aware access control 
model for expressing the access control rules introduced in our 
motivating example. Each of these rules actually mix NA and RA 
rules. Some NA and RA rules reference the user’s consent. We do 
the assumption that the user’s consent is materialized by a 
Consent element present in each folder. The Consent 
element is in turn composed of subelements (e.g., directory, 
marketing) expressing each dimension of this user’s consent. 
For expressing R1, three NA rules are required. NA1, NA2 and 
NA3 capture the information strictly required by the hospital’s 
directory group to accomplish their duty (typically, MedActs and 
Analysis are withdrawn). RA1 depersonalizes ([Φ]) the 
medical service ancestor (/* targets all medical service elements) 
of each folder owned by a patient who didn’t consent disclosing 
that information and disconnects that folder from its siblings 
([⊥]). For rule R2, RA2 alone expresses a path reduction 
discarding the parent Protocol ([†]) of Act elements. For 
expressing R3, two NA rules deny to the medical lab access to the 
name and address of patients who didn’t consent disclosing this 
information for marketing purpose. For patients giving their 
consent, RA3 precludes the inference between the identification 
information (Name, Address) and the rest of the folder.  
Rule R1: 
NA1: < DirectoryGroup , /Hospital, + > 
NA2: < DirectoryGroup, //MedActs, - > 
NA3: < DirectoryGroup, //Analysis, - > 
RA1: < DirectoryGroup, /*, /Folder[./Consent/Directory  
 /Service=  'no visible'], [Φ], [⊥] > 
Rule R2:   
RA2: < Pharmacist, //MedActs/Protocol, /Act, [†],[⊥]> 
Rule R3:  
NA5: < Medical lab, //Folder[./Consent/Marketing/  
 PersonalInfo='no visible']/name, - > 
NA6: < Medical lab, //Folder[./Consent/Marketing/  
 PersonalInfo ='no visible ']/Address, - > 
RA3: < Medical lab, //Folder, /Name, [],  [Address]> 
Figure 3 . Motivating example's NA & RA rules 
4.4 Conflict resolution 
Three classes of conflicts have to be tackled in a relationship-
aware model: conflicts among NA rules, conflict between NA and 
RA rules and conflicts among RA rules. The resolution of 
conflicts among NA rules is directly inherited from existing XML 
access control models and is detailed in Section 4.2. Conflicts 
between NA and RA rules are avoided by construction since RA 
rules are defined on the view produced by the evaluation of NA 
rules, according to an open policy. In other words, NA rules 
always take precedence on RA rules. This section is thus devoted 
to the management of the third class of conflicts, namely conflicts 
among RA rules. 
Again, three classes of conflicts among RA rules have to be 
distinguished: conflicts on Desc (different rules targeting the same 
descendant node), on Path-visibility (different rules targeting the 
same ancestor-descendant relationship with different Path-
visibility options) and on Sibling (different rules targeting the 
same ancestor-descendant relationship with different Sibling 
decorrelations) 
Conflicts on Desc 
Conflicts on Desc arise when two rules RA1 and RA2 are such 
that RA1.Anc⊆RA2.Anc and RA1.Desc=RA2.Desc, here ⊆ 
denotes the inclusion of XPath expressions.  
Independently of the value of the Path-visibility and Sibling 
parameters, rule RA1 states that a new path has to be created from 
any pair of nodes (Parent(n1),n2) such that n1∈RA1.Anc and 
n2∈RA1.Desc, thereby hiding the ancestor relationship between 
n1 and n2. Similarly, rule RA2 states that a new path has to be 
created from any pair of nodes (Parent(n3),n2) such that 
n3∈RA2.Anc and n2∈ RA2.Desc. Since RA1.Anc⊆RA2.Anc, 
Parent(n3)∈ Anc(Parent(n1)). Thus, hiding the ancestor 
relationship between n3 and n2 in turn hides the one between n1 
and n3, due to the transitivity of the ancestor relationship. In other 
words, RA1 is subsumed by RA2. 
Conflicts on Path-Visibility 
Path-visibility conflicts arise when two different rules, targeting 
the same ancestor-descendant relationship (i.e., 
RA1.Anc=RA2.Anc and RA1.Desc=RA2.Desc), exhibit two 
different Path-visibility. Table 3 summarizes all possible 
combinations of Path-visibility for these two rules and their 
associated conflict resolution. The proposed conflict resolution 
being commutative, operand1 and operand2 represent either the 
Path-visibility of RA1 or RA2. While solving conflicts, the 
decision is always taken based on the least privilege principle. 
If one rule does not impose any restriction on the path, the Path-
visibility of the second rule always takes precedence (row 1). If 
one rule discards all nodes from the path, its Path-visibility 
always takes precedence (row 2). Row 3 is self-explanatory. If 
one rule depersonalizes all nodes on the path while the other rule 
selects a list of labels, this list of labels has to be expanded with 
missing depersonalized labels (row 4). Finally, if each rule selects 
a list of labels, the union of the two lists has to be computed (row 
5). If the same label is present on both lists, labeli† takes 
precedence over labeliΦ. 
Table 3.  Path-visibility conflict resolution 
Operand1 Operand2 Conflict Resolution 
[ ] ∀ Operand2 
 [†] ∀ [†] 
[Φ] [Φ] [Φ] 
[Φ] [label1?,…, 
labeln?] 
∀ node ∈ Path(anc,desc) 
if φlabel (node) ∉ [label1?,..,labeln?] 
then  
[label1?,.,labeln?] U [φlabel (node)Φ] 
[label1?,..., 
labeln?] 
[label'1?,…, 
label'n?] 
L = [label1?,…,labeln?] U 
[label'1?,…,label'n?] 
∀labeli∈ L, labeli†∈ L and  
labeli Φ ∈ L ⇒ L – [labeli Φ] 
Conflicts on Sibling 
Sibling conflicts arise when two different rules, targeting the same 
ancestor-descendant relationship, exhibit two different sibling 
decorrelations. Table 4 summarizes all possible combinations of 
Sibling for these two rules and their associated conflict resolution. 
Again, the proposed conflict resolution being commutative, 
operand1 and operand2 represent either the Sibling parameter of 
RA1 or RA2 and the conflict resolution is done in accordance 
with the least privilege principle. 
Table 4. Sibling conflict resolution 
Operand1 Operand2 Conflict Resolution 
[⊥] ∀ [⊥]  
[≡] ∀ Operand2 
 [ψ] [label1, … 
labeln] 
[ψ] if φlabel (desc) ∈[label1, … abeln],  
[⊥] otherwise 
[label1, … 
labeln] 
[label'1, … 
label'n] 
[label1…labeln]∩[label'1…label'n]=Α,  
[⊥] if A= ∅  
Row 1 states that [⊥] takes always precedence over [ψ], 
[label1,…,labeln] and [≡], since it is the most restrictive policy 
(the descendant is disconnected from all its siblings). In the same 
way, [ψ] and [label1,…,labeln] takes always precedence over [≡], 
since [≡] is the less restrictive policy (row 2). Conflicts between 
[ψ] and [label1,…,labeln] (row 3) and between two lists of labels 
(row 4) can be treated uniformly, considering that [ψ] is nothing 
but the singleton [φlabel (desc)]. Solving the conflict sums up to 
compute the intersection between both lists of labels. If this 
intersection turns to be empty, [⊥] becomes the final decision. 
Note that sibling conflicts may happen indirectly if a same node is 
selected to participate in different groups of siblings (e.g., RA1:<-
,/B,-,[A]> and RA2:<-,/C,-,[A]>). The intuition may lead to 
duplicate A elements in order to integrate them at the same time 
in B’s and C’s siblings. However, the presence of the same A 
element(s) in both sets may allow some inference regarding the 
relationship between B and C elements. For this reason, the 
conflict is solved by enforcing [⊥] as the Sibling parameter of the 
conflicting rules. 
5. RELATED WORKS 
As stated in the introduction, the problem of regulating access to 
XML documents has attracted a considerable attention from the 
database community in recent years. 
Most discretionary access control (DAC) models for XML 
[1,2,3,8,12] share the same foundation while proposing different 
interpretations or options to define subjects, to propagate rules 
down through the hierarchy and to solve conflicts among rules. 
[19] introduces static analysis rather than run-time checks for this 
class of models. [16] proposes a provisional access control model 
that allows for more sophisticated controls (e.g., an access can be 
granted provided it is recorded in an audit trail). All these models 
focus on node authorizations and then fail in answering the 
requirements introduced in our motivating example. In addition, 
and as mentioned in the introduction, expressing an exception to a 
negative rule may lead to tricky situations that are difficult to 
manage accurately without relationship authorization. While this 
situation is even not mentioned in certain proposals, some models 
preclude it [2,12,19] while some others disclose the label of 
forbidden ancestors [8,16] or disclose at least the presence of 
these ancestors by replacing their label by a dummy value [10,13]. 
In addition to dummy labels, [10] provides a new answer to this 
problem by transforming the view of a given path thanks to an 
XPath expression (executed at traversal time), under the 
assumption that the resulting view remains compliant with the 
DTD provided to the subject. 
Role-based access control (RBAC) models for XML [15,25] 
suffer from the same limitation wrt access control on XML 
relationships. Finally, mandatory access control (MAC) models 
for XML deserve an interesting remark regarding the management 
of XML relationships. MAC models are generally monotonic, 
meaning that sensitivity level (classification in the MAC vocable) 
assigned to objects increase along the hierarchy (i.e., descendants 
have a higher sensitivity level than their respective ancestor). 
Therefore, the situation where a given subject is granted access to 
a descendant of a prohibited node can simply not be expressed. 
[7] introduces a non-monotonic MAC model that circumvents this 
limitation. However, the focus of this work is on optimizing the 
secure evaluation of XPath twig queries. Query rewriting 
techniques are used to append additional security check predicates 
on sensitivity levels to the original twig query. Therefore, the 
model can grant access to a descendant of a forbidden node but no 
visibility can be given of the path from the document root to this 
node. 
The protection of relationships has been considered in other 
contexts. Access control models for object-oriented databases 
handle relationship authorizations but with a focus on 
instantiation and inheritance [21]. [4] deals with the identification 
of sensitive associations in a relational context but for release 
control rather than access control. Finally, [14] introduces the 
concept of association security objects in the RDF context. An 
history of query results is built and serves for the detection of 
forbidden correlations among data.  
Therefore, we are not aware of other works trying to tackle the 
classification disclosure and uniform filiation problems in XML. 
In addition, due to the lack of explicit ancestor relationship 
authorizations, granting access to a descendant of a prohibited 
node is either impossible or source of important difficulties in 
existing models. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Several access control models have been proposed so far for 
regulating access to XML documents. By focusing on node 
authorizations and disregarding relationship authorizations, these 
models fail in answering the classification disclosure and uniform 
filiation problems. The consequence is the violation of the need-
to-know and consent principles (two basic principles of laws 
related to the safeguard of personal information) in a number of 
situations.  
To tackle this important issue, we advocate the integration of 
ancestor and sibling relationships as first class citizen in the 
access control models for XML. More precisely, this paper makes 
the following contributions. First, it characterizes two classes of 
relationship authorizations (ancestor depersonalization and path 
reduction) taking into account the sibling relationship dimension. 
Two mechanisms (cloning and shuffling) are introduced to 
translate accurately these authorizations into an authorized view 
of a source document. Second, it proposes a rule-based 
formulation for these classes of relationship authorizations 
allowing their seamless integration in existing XML access 
control models. This makes these models (some of them being 
well recognized today) relationship-aware.  
In [11], we shown that tractable algorithms can be devised to 
support relationship authorizations. To this end, we extended a 
public domain XML access control algorithm and we conducted 
preliminary performance measurements. In this setting, the 
control of relationship authorizations represented less than 15% of 
the total cost in most situations. The next step in our research 
agenda is to study streaming algorithms supporting relationship 
authorizations. Streaming access control is actually a major issue 
with respect to performance (management of large documents) 
and support of new forms of data delivery (selective data 
dissemination).  
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